SOME NEW ROOMS.

Mr. Lincoln as a General-Mis Talent for

T. RECOND ARTICLE.

Remembering that at this time the old Generals of the Mexican war still on the active list were superannuated, that Lee and the Johnstons had gone over to the re'ellion, and that McCielian, having referend the service through the volunteers, had had the good fortune to bring him-elf prominently into public notice by a successful campaign in West Virgials, it will be seen that he naturally came to the front as Gen. Scott's successor. In other words, his selection was not primarily made by Mr. Lincoln, but was the result of a warlety of fortuitous circumstances, among which were Scott's partiality, the West Virginia campaign, the powerful support of Becretary Chase, and especially the general belief in the regular army, which soon spread to the country, that McClelian was better fitted than any other man in or out of the service for the command of our forces in the field. Mr. Lincoln only followed public opinion in calling him to the head of the Army of the Potomac after McDowell's defeat, and to the head of all our armies on the voluntary retirement of Gen. Scott. Whatever mistake was made in this should manifestly be charged se much to public opinion as to the President. A much graver question has arisen in reference to the relations of Lincoln and McClellan. After the inglorious failure of the latter to at or near the battlefield of Antietam, there were many who thought that this was due to the fact that the Government had failed to properly support McClellan, and some even went so far as to charge the Pres-ident and Secretary of War with a deliberate purpose from the first to thwart his plans and prevent him from succeeding. This is a serious charge, but it is one which McClellan adopted and strenuously mainsained to the day of his death. That he failed absolutely and on every point to establish this proposition has often been conclusively shown, and now the present parrative makes it still more plain, if possible. It shows, to be sure, that early and radical difes of opinion arose between Mr. Lincoln and Gen. McClellan, not only as to when the sampaign should begin, but upon what line of enerations it should be conducted. The President favored the line straight forward toward Manassas, not only because the army moving in that direction would always cover Washington, but because it would scener find the enemy. McClellan favored a line from the lower Chesspeake, and ultimately adopted one leading up the Peninsula from Fortress Monroe.

It is not worth while to recount the insolance with which that General declined at first to make his plans known to his constitutional superior to dwell upon his frequent acts of insubordination while he was trying to carry them out those plans, and of his conduct toward the Government, has been forever settled on the evidence of the letters published in " His Own Story." They form a complete vindication of the President, and do not afford a single ray of justification for their author. The only question left worthy of a moment's

consideration relates to the comparative merits of the line of operations advocated by Lincoln. and afterward adopted by Grant with such signal success, and that followed by McClellan with such unfortunate results. When it is considered that over thirty days were consumed by the Army of the Potomac in making what Swinton has termed "that giant's stride." from Washington to Fortress Monroe; that during the whole of this time the army. cooped up as it was on a fleet of transports, was as completely out of the actual theatre of war as if it had been in Kamschatka; and finally that Johnston and Lee, so far as Mein was concerned, could have marched all of their forces from Manassas to Washington. ore, and Philadelphia, and back to Richmond before the latter could possibly have left his transports and got within striking distance of the enemy, it will be seen that the line chosen by McClellan was what is known by military writers as an exterior one, and there'ore in-admissible, while the one favored by the President was an interior one, and entirely in accordance with correct practice. Of course it may be contended that the strength of the Army of the Potomac was great enough to percover and protect the national capital, as was done, but this was no merit of McClellan's, for it is well known that he was on the eve of taktterly that the President withheld McDowell's corps from him after it had been arranged that it should go.

The sequel shows that, even in this matter, the President was right and McClellan was wrong, and that the entire plan of the latter was an unpardonable violation of that maxim of war which forbids the division of an invading army in such way and by such obstacles as would render it impossible to reunite it, in the theatre of action, before the enemy can concentrate an overwhelming force for the destruction of either part. It is incontestable that all of Pope's disasters were the direct sequence of his violation of the maxim just mentioned, and that the Army of the Potomac was never reunited again till it reached the battlefield of Antietam, where it woo its only victory under McClelian.

An effort has been made to show that the President committed a serious mistake in relieving McCiellan from the command of the Army of the Potomas after he had grossed the Potomas and started once more in search of Lee. But in view of the fact that two months had elapsed and incessant efforts had been made to repair the army's losses and to force its unwilling commander to resume operations, it is difficult to perceive what else the President could have done. Forbearance had certainly ceased to be a virtue, and while it may be contended, perhaps with reason, that McCiellan could not have done worse than his successors. Burnside and Hooker, his removal was followed by no disaster, and at least had the merit of clearing the way for those who were not afraid to seek the enemy or to fight him when found, and who in turn were eliminated before a successful leader was discovered by the Government.

The entire episode of Lincoln's relations with McClellan may be confidently relied upon to establish the character of the former for wisdom, foresight, and aggressive temper, as well as for patience and forbearance; but it has been so fully discussed and elucidated that we leave it, with the following quotation from an unanswerable letter written by Lincoln to McGlelian on the 9th of April, 1862:

"And once more let me tell you it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I sm powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field inonly shifting and not surmounting a difficulty: that we would find the same enemy and the and so it turned out, and so disaster followed. wiftly and surely, and in almost overwhelming magnitude!

There was only one point in all this misfortune wherein Lincoln and Halleck, his militune wherein lincoin and risince, his mili-tary advisor, seem to have been clearly blame-worthy, and that was in notifying McClellan at Harrison's Landing that they had no re-enforcements to send him, for such was not the once. It is now well known that they had at that time over 20,000 effective men engaged in construce expeditions against the Carolinas, every one of whom might have been sent to the James River without giving up any valuable possessions or surrendering any feasible been of operatious against the enemy. The taly justification for failing to adopt this measure of concentration was that McClellan mand, that it was unsafe to trust him with mand, that it was unsafe to trust him with
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enemy had two million, and then be would alt down in the mud and yell for three." It is clearly shown by the narrative of events, that Stonewall Jackson's first valley campaign, ordered for the purpose of engaging the attention of Banks, threatening Washington, and making a strong diversion in favor of Loc, was arrested in the full tide of victory by combinations and movements directed solely by Mr. Lincoln. The lack of space forbids a recitation of the incidents which establish the truth of this assertion, but they fully justify the conclusion that "If Fremont and McDowell had met Jackson at Strasburg and Banks had followed upon his beels, as Mr. Lincoin had clearly and explicitly ordered, nothing could have prevented the capture or de struction of his command."

VI. In yielding to the clamor for the assignment of Frement to the command in Missouri, in appointing him untried in any adequate field. to the high rank of Major-General in the regular army, and in assigning him to an important command in Virginia, after his vaparies in the West had become known. it cannot be denied that Mr. Lincoln made s erres of grave mistakes, which the country paid for by a bountiful crop of misfortunes The regular army officers were quite as unanimous and outspoken in the opinion from the start that Fremont was entirely incompetent as they were that McClellan was a military genins, and the result showed that for once their preconceived opinion. although differing but alightly from a guesa, was entirely correct.

possessed none of the merits, except that of good fortune, which should have been looked for either in a Presidential candidate or in a military leader; and that in the first instance he owed his selection to a popular craze, and in the second to the ardent support of the Blairs, backed by Secretary Chase. And here we may remark that the latter had the singular misfortune of becoming in turn the friend and supporter of nearly all the oreign adventurers and native incompetents who made their appearance during the war.

That Mr. Lincoln yielded to the pressure in behalf of the man who had been the first candidate of his own party for the Presidency was per-haps natural. He "guessed" that there might be something in him. and guessed wrong, but he did everything in his power to supply him with wisdom. From the utter and complete failure of all his efferts, although he took more pains with him than with any one else, not even excepting McClellan, it may be fairly inferred that there was nothing in the man to build upon, and such will doubtless be the verdict of history. It cannot be better expressed than in the words which Lincoln finally used in regard to him: "I thought well of remont Even now I think well of his impulses. I only think he is the prey of wicked and designing men, and I think he has absolutely no military capacity."

VII.

In considering the great campaigns in the isstppi valley the careful student will not fail to observe that the final result vin-dicated Lincoln's two fundamental ideas. first, that the Mississippi River should be opened and protected by a series of great military posts, as recommended by Gen. Scott. and secondly, that Cumberland Gap and East Tennessee should be occupied. In the early days of 1862 he formulated his wishes in respect to the latter, but they were strongly opposed by Buell, who urged. by letter, a movement on Nashville instead. In replying to Bueil the President expressed himself modestly as follows: not competent to criticise your views, and, therefore, what I offer is in justification of myself. Of the two. I would rather have a point on the railroad south of Cumberland Gap than Nashville. First, because it cuts a great artery of the enemy's communication which Nashville does not; and secondly, because it is in the midst of a loyal people who would raily around it. while Nashville is not." He backed up these irrefutable military arguments by the citation of the most important political truths, but in vain. McClellan, Buell, and Halleck were too much for him, and had their own way as to their plans of operations in the West . but they did not remove his anxiety nor silence his ceaseless injunctions in behalf of coopera-tion toward the great objects all had in view. On Jan. 18, 1862, in the midst of his many cares, he wrote to Buell as follows:

"I state my general idea of this war to be that we have the greater numbers, and the enemy has the greater facility of concentrate ing nearly the whole of the army with him to ing forces upon points of collision; that we the Peninsula, and always complained most must fall unless we can find some way of making our advantage an overmatch for his: and that this can only be done by menacing him with superior forces at different points at the same time, so that we can safely attack one or both if he makes no change: and if he weakens one to strengthen the other, forbear to attack the strengthened one, but seize and hold the weakened one, gaining so much." To illustrate, he then pointed out that the loss of the Bull Run campaign the year before was not due to a movement on exterior lines so much as to a failure to use exterior lines with judgment and concert. and then he added: plying the principle to your case, my idea is that Halleck shall menace Columbus and 'down river' generally, while you menace Bowling Green and East Tennessee. If the enemy shall concentrate at Bowling Green, de not retire from his front, yet do not fight him there, either, but seize Columbus and East Tennessee, one or both left expessed by the concentration at Bowling Green.

It will not escape the critical reader that the principle here inculcated was kept constantly in view in the subsequent operations from Cairo. during which the name of Grant became known to the world by the signal victory at Donelson. Columbus, Nashville, and most of west Ton-nessee fell under the control of the national arms, but it is to be regretted that owing to the little faith of Buell. East Tennessee did. meet the same fate till two years later. Whether Grant saw this wise letter of Lincoln's before he started on the expedition against Fort Henry and Fort Donelson or even upon the campaign of Vicksburg, is doubtful; but it is an interesting coincidence that his first, second, and last great campaigns were conducted in pursuance of principles and upon lines of operation always advocated, in not originally pointed out, by the President.

It appears from the narrative that a copy of this letter was sent to Gen. Halleck, and hat in his rambling reply he went out of his way to denounce what with ill-concealed contempt he styled "pepper-box strategy." was the first time this phrase is known to have been used in connection with American milltary operations, but it was too descriptive to long remain conceased and soon became cur-rent in the newspapers as well as in the army as the best one with which to designate the strategy for which Hallock became mainly responsible after his abortive campaign from Shiich to Corinth. Whether or not Mr. Lin-coln gave it out can never be positively known. but the presumption is that he did. He cer-tainly appreciated the wit of it, and was not above getting even with his pedantic critic

in that way. Shortly after the close of that campaign, Mo-Cle ian was relieved from duty as General-in-Chief, and Halleck was ordered to Washington to take hi place. Lincoln received him kindly, and always remained on good terms with him, utilizing his technical knowledge. which was certainly very great to the utmost; but it would be improper to say that Halleek ever became anything more than shief of staff to the President. From that day forth the latter exercised all the constitutional powers of Commander-in-Chief, and as such is entitled to the glory of leading the country to its final victors over the mobility. victory over the rebellion. All his orders, whether issued to McClellan, Buell, Burnside, Rosecrans. Meade, or Grant, were given in pre-cise and unmistakable terms. All his advice was clear and supported by the soundest judgment and the most irrefutable principles of the art of

of the Army of the Petomac, were models of kindness and perspicacity as well as of sound military reasoning. His patience with the stupidity of Burnside and his watchfulness over the incompetency of Hooker are worthy of all praise. He was solely responsible for the assignment of the latter to the command of the Army of the Potomac, and for that reason perhaps took unusual care to protect him from the results of his own mis-guided rashness, restraining him from cross-ing the Rappahannock for the purpose of attacking Fredericksburg, and doing this in language so homely, yet so witty, that no military reader will ever forget it. "The enemy," said the President, "would fight in intrenchments and have you at a disadvantage, and so. man for man, worst you at that point, while his main force would in some way be getting the advantage of you northward. In one word, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river like an ox jumped half over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other."

Later, when Lee had started north and Hooker, despairing of stopping him, proposed to march directly upon Richmond, one cannot help admiring the calm judgment with which the President replied: "If left to me, I would not go south of the Rappahannock upon Lee's moving north of it. I think Lee's army and not Richmond is your sure objective point.

If he comes toward the upper Potomac, follow on his flank and on his inside track, shortening your lines while he lengthens his; fight him, too, when opportunity offers. If he stays where he is, fret him and fret him."

Again, it should be noted that this advice contains the first enunciation of the principle which won for Grant imperishable fame, for it was by making Lee's army and not Richmond his "sure objective" that he gained that memorable series of victories which ended the re-bellion at Appomattox Court House.

No man having the slightest soldierly instinct can, even at this late day, read the pregnant suggestions contained in Lincoln's homely words that "if its head is on the Potembe must be thin in spots somewhere," without feeling a profound sense of regre that the Federal commander should not have availed himself of that chance at least to show that he was fairly entitled to the popular name of Fighting Joe Hooker."

It is impossible to read this portion of the narrative under consideration without perceiving that Lincoln had come to under-stand and to distrust thoroughly his vain and insubordinate lieutenant long before he had crossed into Pennsylvania in pursuit of ering with Hallack and his dictatorial temper toward all in authority over him, without approving the promptitude with which the President granted his petulant request to be relieved from command.

VIII.

This was the beginning of the end. . The process of trial and rejection had at last brought a leader for the Army of the Potomac who, although far from brilliant, was capable. bonest, and true, a knightly soldier, who was destined a few weeks later to turn the Confederacy forever back upon itself, and to follow it thenceforth, though he-statingly to be sure, to its final overthrow at Appomattox Court House. From this time on the watchfulness of Lincoln was just as alert and earnest, but he had less occasion for the daily supervision and instruc-tion of the Generals in the field. He fully appreciated Meade's great victory at Gettysburg and, through Halleck, urged him strenuously. and with the prescience of a great commander to make it complete by following up and destroying the retreating rebel army before it could recross the Potomac. On learning that Lee had escaped, he sent a despatch to Meade expressing his great dissatisfaction at the result." and frequently afterward "regretted that he had not himself gone to the army and a letter which he wrote to Mande but never sent the whole case is admirably summarized:

"You fought and beat the enemy at Gettys burg. and, of course, to say the least, his loss was as great as yours. He retreated and you did not, as it seemed to me, pressingly pursue him; but a flood in the river detained him till by slow degrees you were again upon him. You had at least twenty thousand veteran troops with you and as many more raw ones within supporting distance, all in addition to those who fought with you at Gettysburg. while it was not possible that he had received a single recruit, and yet you stood and let the flood run down, bridges be built, and the enemy move away at his leisure without eral. I do not believe you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in Lee's escape. He was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with our other late successes, have ended the war. As it is, the war will be prolonged indefinitely. If you could not safely attack Lee last Monday, how can you possibly do so south of the river, where you can take with you very few more than two-thirds of the force you then had in hand? It would be unreasonable to expest, and I do not expect that you can now effect much. Your golden opportunity is gone. and I am distressed immeasurably because

The removal of Halleck to Washington as General-in-Chief had left Grant the ranking officer in the West, but he had not yet won Mr. Lincoln's complete confidence and support. Indeed, there is good reason for the supposition that he was decidedly under suspicion Be this as it may, it is well known that the President had not in any degree lost his interest in the great problem of opening the Mississippl to the Gulf. and that he was profoundly convinced that the proper line of operations for that was the great river itself. It is also known that he had granted authority to his fellow townsman, Gen. McClernand, to raise a special force in the Northwest for use under his own command in this great operation. It was doubtless his intention to give McClernand complete control. but he was thwarted in this by the advice of Col. Rawlins and other staff officers, who urged Grant to claim his own rights in the premises and finally induced him to do so. Being the department commander, as well as the senior Major-General in that region. Halleck upheld him in his claim and authorized him not only to take complete charge of all the arrangements for the Vicksburg expedition, but to assume command of it in person whenever he thought best. It has always been supposed that Lincoln's preference for McClernand was in its origin political rather than military, but it was more or less strengthened by the common rumore at that time in circulation in regard to Grant's drinking. It is also to be remembered that McClernand was not only an influential war Democrat, but was a man of correct, if not austere habits, approved courage, and bound-less ambition, and that he had recently spent some time in Washington advocating the open-ing of the Mississippi River at any cost.

The emergency was an important one to Grant, and also to the country. Fortunately for both, Mr. Lincoln yielded to the advice of Halleck and let him and Grant have their way. McClernand, relying doubtless on the ton, became restless and insubordinate, and was finally relieved from command of the Thirteenth Corps and sent to await orbecame restless and insubordinate. ders at his home in Springfield. Lincoln raised no objections, but was not long in finding aless conspictions, but was not long in find-ing aless conspictions field of usefulness for his friend. Meanwhile he kept a close watch on Grant's operations saying but little in his favor, but declaring firmly that "he should have his chance." He finally closed all further discussion by saying: "If I knew what brand of whiskey he drinks, I would send s barrel or so to some of the other Generals." During the long delays and abortive efforts of Grant to capture Vicksburg or to turn it, he kept silence, and this in the face of Rosecrans' failure to sooperate, by an advance from mid-

his Generals seemed to be doing their best to open it he retrained from criticism or inter-ference. But shortly after the crowning victory of the campaign, he wrote magnanimous ly to Grant as follows: "I do not remember that you and I ever met personally. I write this now as a grateful acknowledgment for the almost inestimable service you have done the country. I wish to say a word further: When you first reached the vicinity of Vicksburg I thought you should do what you finally did. march the troops across the neck, run the batteries with the transports, and thus go below: and I never had any faith except a general hope that you knew better than I, that the Yanoo Pass expedition could succeed. When you got below and took Port Gibson, Grand Gulf, and vicinity, I thought you should go down the river and join Gen. Banks, and when you turned northward, east of the Big Black, I feared it was a mistake. I now wish to make personal acknowledgment that you were right and I was wrong."

Many humanitarians and some military writers have given great praise to Lincoln for the emancipation of the slaves and for their organization as soldiers of the Union. But candor compels the admission that those measures were political rather than military. Believing them to be necessary and proper, Mr. Lincoln was clearly justified in res to them, but it is now generally admitted by military critics that they produced but little effect upon the course of the war, and that the national arms would have been triumphant without them at as carly a day as they were with them. It is a self-evident proposition. equally applicable to a battle, a campaign, or a great war, that if you cannot win with all your resources you cannot win with a part of them: but it is a fact that neither Grant. Sherman, Thomas, Sheridan, nor any of the other great soldiers of the Union primarily favored the arming of slaves as a part of the national forces. If the truth must be told, neither they nor the troops anywhere took much interest in the alavery question. They all came to favor emancipation in the end, but more as a means of weakening the rebellion than of strengthening the nation's resources. It was love of the Union, burning always flerce and bright among the people and in the army, rather than any abstract sentiment in condemnation of slavery, which ultimately triumph d over the forces of the rebellion. In dealing with this question it must be conlessed, therefore, that while the President's reasoning was sound and his policy unassailable, he was, perhaps unconsciously, controlled by the wisdom of a philosopher and a statesman rather than of a General. If the benefits of the measures adopted were not immediately apparent, they were destined to become abundantly so for all future time in the life of the nation and in the history of the human race. And there is no event in all his career that will be so long remembered by mankind as the freeing of the slaves.

During the Vicksburg campaign Mr. Lincoln did all in his power to induce Rosecrans to make an early movement, not only for the redemption of Tennesses, but also to assist the campaigns of Grant and Hooker, by withdrawing troops from their front or at least by preventing reenforcements against them. But Rosecrans did nothing from New Year's Day till midsummer, and when he finally moved, was so late in the season that Bragg, reënforced by the prisoners which Grant had captured and paroled at Vicksburg. and by a heavy detachment from the rebel army of North Virginia. under Longstreet, turned upon Rosecrans, and delivered to him such a staggering blow at Chickamauga as to drive him back into Chatta nooga. Lincoln foresaw it all, and did his utmost to prevent it. but in vain. His opinionated subordinate could not realize that the President, a mere civilian, could have any views as to military questions worth considering. Their relations seem never to have rested on a satisfactory basis. Rosecrans was always querulous and captious, always swift to assail the Administration, always slow to assail the enemy. When he received his promotion as Major-General he protested vehemently against the date of it and drew from Mr. Lincoln one of his wisest letters. "As to your request that your comm ssion should date from December, 1881," said the President, " of course you expected to gain something by this; but you should remember that precisely so much as you should gain by it others would lose by it. If the thing you sought had been exclusively ours we would have given it cheerfully, but, being the right of other men. we having merely arbitrary power over it, the taking it from them and giving it to you became a more delicate matter. * * * Truth to speak. I do not appreciate this matter of rank on paper as you officers do. The world will not forget that you fought the battle of Stone River, and it will never care a fig whether you rank Gen. Grant on paper or he so ranks you. * * * And now be assured. he concludes. "you wrong both yourself and us when you even suspect there is not the best disposition on the part of us all here to

oblige you." And so it was to the end, always patient, always kindly, always suggestive and helpful, and yet never duly appreciated by his unfortu-nate subordinate. After the occupation of Chattanooga and Knoxville, the latter having been taken by the very line of operations pointed out by Mr. Lincoln in the first month of the war, he became most solicitous that those important strategic points should be held at every cost, and it was directly to his persist-ent and personptory advice that Grant, the one victorious General of the war, was finally put in supreme command, with headquarters at Chattanooga, and that Sherman and Hooker with their veteran troops, were sent to rednforce the army at the head of which the steadfast Thomas had now been placed.

To Mr. Lincoln, the Commander-in-Chief of all the armies, the concentration of this irresistible force was primarily due. The responsibility was his, and a great part of the credit should be awarded to him for it. and also for the magnificent results which followed

With the Mississippi River now flowing "un-vexed to the sea." East Tennessee and northern Georgia now firmly in the grasp of the loyal armies, and the Army of the Potomac occupying the direct line to Richmond, and brought to a higher pitch of strength and efficiency than ever before, the President began to breathe more easily. For the first time victory, absolute and complete, seemed to be within his reach. A chieftain of good fortune as well as of ability had at last been developed by the war, and it now only remained to clothe him with the necessary rank and give him the Congress made haste to do the former, while Mr. Lincoln, feeling that he could now sately relinguish the supreme command to the newly appointed Lieutenant-General, did so in the following comprehensive words: "Gen. Grant: The nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what re-mains to do in the existing great struggle, are now presented with this commission consti-tuting you Lieutenant-General in the army of the United States. With this high honor devolves upon you also a corresponding responsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so under God it will sustain you. I scarcely need to add that with what I here speak for the nation goes my own hearty personal concur-

rence."

He did not seek to control Grant's ideas, but early wrote him, as no other ruler ever wrote to his subordinate: "The particulars of your plan I neither know nor seek to know. You are vigilant and self-reliant: and, pleased with this. I wish not to obtfude any constraints or restraints upon you. * If there is any-thing wanting which is within my power to give, do not fall to let me know it. And now, with a brave army and a just cause, may God

sustain you." It is well known that Grant went to the Army of the Potomac with his mind inclined to the adoption of McClellan's plan of operagiving to the officer who exercised them com-mand on a line more nearly in consonance with his views. How he came to select the "over-land route" has never been fully explained. Indeed, it is doubtful if any man now living knows; but one thing is certain, Lincoln was perfectly satisfied with it, for, as already pointed out, it was his own line, substantially the one which he had urged McDowell and McClellan to follow from the start, and which completely cover Washington. Inasmuch as it also enabled Gen. Grant to find his doughty antagonist by the shortest possible march, at most in a few hours, and to bring into action against him the greatest possible number of men, it was in full accord with the principles which underlie the art of war as taught by all the great authorities.

It is not within the limits of this paper to

discuss the tacties or the detailed management of the campaigns which were conducted in Virginia and elsewhere under the command of the Lieutenant-General, Mr. Lincoin kep s watchful eye over them, giving his views fully and freely when they were asked for or he thought it necessary, but never interfering with the operations now advancing under such competent hands to a satisfactory con clusion. Employing every resource of the Government, he waited with what calmness and patience he could command for the result. No ruler ever more loyally supported Generals whom he sent into the field. He filled every requisition and made every appointment he was asked for, if it was within his power or province. He placed all the military powers of the Government in the hands of the soldiers who now led the armies, and yet, as the end drew nigh, he gave them timely and distinct notice that their sole business was to win bat ties, and destroy the armies of the rebellion while he reserved to himself and Congress the complete control of the terms under which reace might be made and the reign of civil law reestablished.

X. It is not to be contended that Lincoln, whose duties as head of the Government necessarily confined him to the control of its military policy, and as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy to the consideration of questions of strategy, or the general direction of campaigns, had ever acquired a knowledge of taction. While it is indubitable that he sought to control the combination of masses and their direction upon the vital noints of the Confederacy, against its principal armies, and in this great branch of the military art developed a higher degree of skill than any of his Generals, it was manifest ly out of his province to manœuvre the national forces in the presence of the enemy. What would have been his success had he done this must always remain a matter of conjecture; but considering his modesty, his perfect self-reliance, his foresight, his wisdom, his wary and crafty nature, and, above all, his unshakable resolution, it is not to be supposed that he would have made a fallure as a tactician. He resembled Lee in many of the loftler attributes of character. and was his equal if not his superior in such as are possessed in common by all leaders of men. With the same military education and experience there can be scarcely a doubt that he would have equalled if he had not surpassed the foremost soldier of his time. Of course he knew but little of logistics or the details of organizing, supplying, and moving armies, but these are the purely technical branches of the business that any well instructed officer can manage, and which were managed with extraordinary ability in our armies; thus they were clearly beyond his sphere of duty, and may be neglected in an estimate of his place in history as a military man. The work of Nicolay and Hay centains many despatches, letters and documents, and many interesting chapters, such as those relating to the " Trent affair" and to the rebel cruisers, and also to the able administration of the navy by Mr Welles and his subordinates, throwing light upon Lincoln's extraordinary character as the head of the Government in a great military crisis; but to comment upon them would require a volume. No one can read them dispassionately without reaching the conclusion that Lincoln was not only a great statesman, but in a larger sense a great General, and a great administrator, the great est that this country ever produced, with the possible exception of Washington alone.

The policy and plans advocated by him will bear the closest and most critical scrutiny. It has been shown that such of them as were fairly tried were successful, and it must always remain a matter of profound regret that country's history his urgent commands were room to doubt that if he had been permitted to have his way, the enemy would have been vigorously at:acked immediately after the battle of Antietam and the battle of Gettysburg. and that the chances were largely in favor of

conclusive victory in both cases.

Finally, in the words of Ralph Waldo Emerson, quoted by our authors, it is truly said: "He grew according to the need; his mind mastered the problem of the day, and as the problem grew so did his comprehension of it. It can-not be said there is any exaggeration of his worth. If ever a man was fairly tested he was. There was no lack of resistance, nor of slander, nor of ridicule. Then what an occasion was the whiriwind of the war! Here was no place for a holiday Magistrate nor fairweather sailor. The new pilot was pinned to the helm in a tornado. In four years, four years of battle days, his endurance, his fertility of resources, his magnanimity, were sorely tried and never found wanting. There, by his courage, his justice, his even temper, his fertile counsel, his humanity, he stood a heroid figure in the centre of a heroic epoch!"

FIFTY YEARS IN PRISON.

After Half a Century Behind Bars John Mount Reformed and Was Respected. From the Louisville Commercial. COVINGTON, Ky., March 21,-Old John Mount. who was one of the most noted criminals the world ever knew, died at the home of his pleas here yesterday morning at the advanced age of 89 years. His life was a checkered one. From a noted and reckless counterfeiter, burglar

anothed and reckless counterfeitor, burglar and thief, he became in the last few years of his life an upright, straightforward, and honest old man, with the entire condidence of all who knew him reasonally.

The old man said that he could with certainty count up lifty years and six months that he had actually served in the prisons of Missouri, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana Ohlo, and lientucky for counterfeiting and other crimes, and was not sure that some time had not escaped his memory. A few years ago John Mount was known as one of the most expert engravers of the United States Treasury notes in the country. His skill for years baffled the Treasury experts and bankers, and many of the notes made by him turned up years after as spurious, after having passed through the banks of the country time and time again undetected. He followed counterfeiting for years, and it was claimed by him that several well-known men in the States named actually grew rich from the result of his labors in engraving counterfeiting of the paper currency of the country, but gold and silver counterfeiting was in the making of spurious coins, which was done before the late was. He served in all twenty-eight years for this character of violations of the laws of his counter.

war. He served in all twenty-eight years for this character of violations of the laws of his country.

He was a bold, desperate man, intelligent above the average, with much dash and vigor, and in his younger days as handsome as he was smart. He was never a cruel man, but, on the other hand, was tender-hearted and generous to all but his outspokes foes. He inver killed a man in his life outright but many of his pursuers before the war carried scars infleted by him to their graves, in the latter years of his life nothing so delighted him as to gather around him on the sidewalk, in the shade of some friendly tree, a number of small children and tell them innecent tales, in the presence of ladies or children he never spoke of his criminal career. All his references to his bandt life seemed to be directed to the one object of having the world bettered by knowing the final miseries of the man who would live such a life.

His last term in Bisate prison was in Kentucky, at Frankfort, where he was sent about twenty years ago for five years for horse stealing. Since the expiration of this term he has lived in this city the life that spright hones.

PORMS WORTH BRADING To Three Adered.

Marie, have you forgotten yet.
The summer days of long age?
The shady lane, where first we most?
The tiny brook's lognacious flow?
I spoke; you answered, half afraid,
And then, and then exquisite biles, As hand in hand we onward strayed. I boldly stole a little kim Louise, have you torgetten yet.

How sweetly once you used to sing?
The sun of those dear days is see.

And love has fled on vanished wing.

Still "wendrous is the power I feet"
Rings sadiy, faintly in my care;
And, le, a moment new I steal
From memory of the bygone years. Pusanne, have you forgotten yet How quick the evening hours would by ?

No, loved one, you will no or forget.
The clasped hands, the tender sigh;
And when the time for parting came,
How does, we thought, our mutual won. Then looks more fraught with love became Than words; but that was long ago. Marie has gone. I know not where. Louise my dear Louise is wed. Susanne is still both young and fair, But all her love for me is dead. Farewell Spannel good-by Marie

Louise, our sun of youth is set! The past lives only now in me, And I alone will no er forget. WILLIAM BARCLAY DUNBAR Doubting Hearts.

Within the shadow a drooping face. Crowned by a wealth of flowers and lace. Park brown eyes under white lide pressed. And fingers that love to be earswed A threat that glistens 'neath priceless pearle Rose in the re-soud garden of girls. I dream of her nightly, gay coquette And wonder if I've half won her yet ! Or if she would look as a veet and fal

suz. Within the shadow, the lights turned down Par from the noise of the restions town, While eyes of the boldest, deepest bine Seem to be looking me through and through: A strong hand clasping about my own, With a touch that straight to my heart has flown: De I love him ? Yes, and always will My heart responds to his own heart's thrill But he looks as tenderly, I suppose, In the eyes of every girl he knows.

P. H. CURTIN A Song of Polly.

Prom the Travelers' Record.

Pelly, Polly, the kettle sings.
There's a puff of steam like fairy wings.
A fragrance of tolong stealing;

Dainty china coelly set,

Pragile as frailest of eggshell, yet

Strong in my housewife a dealing. It's hey for toast, and he for tea! Old reminiscences brought to me
Over the tea with Polly;
There's the fragment of song when hearts were youn
A trembling minor never sung.
Hushed in tears from Polly.

For Polly and I. sy, hey for toast, Ho for the tes. too, who can boast Of youth and love forever! Let broken heart and hint of wrong Find one rier note in the settle's song, Striving with brave andeavor.

So, over the crisp brown tosat for two.

And tes in the old cupe quaint and blue,
licight for bygone folly!

Though yellowest hair has turned to white.
Old soner to minor, yet tonight
We love on, I and Polly!

JEAR KAYE LUDLUM.

The Triuming. From the Clock Stevies.
The medest housewife now who knows
Her husband's word is law,
Berins to trim, nias! once more
Last season's hat of straw. And then, all through the summer menths, While she is gayly awimming. Her husband toils and a aves to pay Her little bitl for trimming.

"The Picture of Elizabeth." From the Boston Evening Franscript I hold it to the dormer pane.

While on the roof there pattereth
The ghostry footfall of the rain:
The picture of Elizabeth,
Around me lie her garments gay;
A slipper, pointed heel and toe,
With which she danced into the day
A contury or more ago!

A yellow satin petticeat,
Wrought with a flower and leaf and vine,
The lace which isy about her threat,
And here a goresous train! Like wine
It falls upon the bare, beard floor.
Hark, how slow music whispersth!
The treats the stately step once more,
This picture maid, Elizabeth.

Unto her partner, sweeping low, the bendeth with a witching grace. The candles all above them glow And light her lifted flower face. This sweet face in the picture dim. He speaks, the great fan fluttereth, and o'er its pinmes she laughs at him, The naughty maid, Elizabeth!

And so ber lips smile now at me;
Her eyes, sables with loy of life,
Only the dawn's rich promise see,
And naught of dusk, with warfare rife;
But hers, beneath the picture prest,
A wraith-like rose, a ghestiy trace,
And hid withm this troubound obes,
Amid the satin and the lace.

A soldier's coat of faded bine. Ah me I turn the pictured eyes
Away from such a sorry sight,
That they smile on and never know
Bow one quick sword thrust caught their light.
Which died a bundred years ago!

Mayhap they shone mid battle's rear.
These eyes, which learned such bitter to
And all his threibling hopes and fears,
and all his threibling hopes and fears,
and agon sions they knew,
That felt the fleeting farewell breath.
'That his by that brave time and true.
This ploture of Elizabeth!

And hera by avery tear and smile.
Is the poor battered ceas of blue:
For love, which did but wait awhile,
lists met in that old world and new.
I leave them to their resting place.
The things of life, the mark of death,
Both guarded by this lovely face,
The plotter of disabetia.

VIRGINIA WOODWARD CLOUD. Brave Love.

From the Fankes Blads. Prom the Fankes Blade.

He'd nothing but his violin,
I'd nothing but my song.

But we were well when these wereplue.
And summer days were long.
And the way had a summer days were long.
The robbins came and took badge.
The robbins came and took badge.
How they had dared to woo and win.
When early apring was cold.
We sometimes supped on dewberries,
Or slopt among the hay:
But oft the farmers' wives at eve.
Came out to hear us play.
The rare old tunes, the dear edd tunes,
We could not starve for long.
While my man had his violin,
And I my sweet love song.

And I my sweet love song.

The world has are gone well with m.
Old man since we were one;
Old man since we were one;
Old man since we were one;
It loug age was done.
But those who wait for gold or gear,
For houses and for kine.
Will never know the forg of hearts
That met without a foar,
When you had but your visilm
And I a song, my dear.

If We Could Know.

From the Roston Courter.
Whither do our footstops tend I here and more we years to Energy. As life a shedows longer grow, And the evening hours decease, And before us lies the end. When the door shall open wide, When the door shall open wide,
And benind as softly close,
Wilait to our expectant eyes
Wilait to our expectant eyes
Wilait to future life disclose?
Hall we see a morning break,
Jair and fragrant and serena,
beeming like the bleesed dream
Of some unforgotten ere
Ehall we walk hi gladness on,
Under smiling skies of blue.
Through an ever deepening dawn,
Inte wide fields fresh and new,
besting these who came before,
And each wall remembered tena,
Knowing each familiar look
And each wall remembered tena,
Elme each other's hands we took.
Saying farewells or and eye,
bhall we talk of earthly days,
kleaking low, with haled breath,
Of the awful mystery
Gour kuman life, and death;
Elad we wonder to recall,
How our hearts were prous to fear,
How we scarcely dared to hope, In any heaven, so fair, so near?
Ab! if we could only know,
As the shadows deeper grow,
Whither our swift footsteps tend,
As they surely near the end!

At the Boor. From the Christian Advention.

I thought mypoif indeed secure.

So fast the decor, so firm the leek;

But, io! he teddling seems to tupe

My perent our with timerous thous. My heart were stone sould by withstead.
The sweetings of my haby's pice.
That ilmarous, bady sneathing and
"Fisase let me in; it's only me."

KATHERIUS & MASON

I threw saids the ununished book.
Regardless of its tempting charma
And. spaning wide the door. I took
My laughing darling in my arma. Who knows but in elernity

\$ like a truns chied, shall wait—
The giories of a life to be.

Beyond the heaventy Father's gate? And will that heavenly Father heed The trunkly oppollouting cry, 40 55 the color for places The L O Father! only 17-

HER MAJESTY, THE QUEEK. Seen by an American Observer While She Was Variously Engaged, LOWDON, March 18.-There was an American sparkle in the London atmosphere. The after-noon was so fine that I took a dash through Hyde Park. I was skirting along the path im-mediately outside the Kensington Gardens, which adjoins the Park, when my attention was attracted by a mounted policeman who seemed in great distress. He had galloped up alongside of a watering cart that was lessurely sprinkling the drive, and was shouting to the

> summary manner, and he neither stopped the water of his cart nor pulled his horse to one "H'out of the road," cried the policeman "'er Majesty comes be'ind." and with these, words he caught the sprinkling cart horse by the bridle and pulled him as well as he could

driver to shut off the water and draw to one

side. Naturally enough the driver was slow to

understand why he was interfered with in this

out of the way. Then a large landau drawn by four horses on which rode postillions, rolled swiftly along the road. On the box of the carriage sat two men, two more sat behind, while in front, on both sides. and in the rear rode a dozen grooms on horseback. On either side of the equipage was an equerry, a gentleman of distinguished appearance, who kept very close to the wheels and exactly opposite to the occupants of the vehicle.

This was the way Victoria. Queen of the English, took a quiet afternoon's drive. She was by the side or her daughter, Princess Bearrice. while two ladies-in-waiting sat on the seat in front of her. The contu-ion caused by the obstruction of the watering cart was noticed by her Majesty, and she sat upright for an instant, while a -wift look of apprehension passed over her features. One of the equerries seaned forward, and, removing his hat, informed her that there was nothing to fear, whereat her Majesty settled back among her cushions and because her placid self again.

As the cavaloade swept round into The

Drive, the fashionable carriage way of the Park, the great throng of equipages meited to the sides of the road, leaving a clear path for the Queen's company to pass through. Hats were raised, and her Majesty slightly inclined her head to the right and left. At Hyde Park

were raised, and her Majesty slightly inclined her head to the right and left. At Hyde Park Corner a large crowd was collected, and as the royal party dashed under the arch a cheer west up. Trame stood still in Piccadiliv as the potential one was whirled across the great thoroughlare, and then the carriage and its guard sped alone under the drooping tranches of the Queen's Drive—where several attempts have been made on her Majesty's life—ourving grandly round through the huge gateways of Buckingh in Palace, which then shut out from public view.

This was the day preceding the first Drawing Room of the season. The Queen had come down from Windsor to receive the girl debutantes and the matrons hitherto unpresented at Buckingham Palace. On the day of the Company, giving way to the Princess of Wales, and going out for her regular drive, which she is not willing to miss, even to comply with the usual royal functions. It was certainly somewhat paradoxical that, while a long line of spiendidly attired women was going through the torturous ordeal of being presented to the Queen, the Queen herself was spinning round Hyde Park, her mind occupied by the picture of springtime promise spread about her, and oblivious, no donor, of the uncomfortable throng that her obliging daughter-in-law was welcoming by proxy.

If her Majesty is a red-laced and somewhat dowdy old lady of a not highly cultured ype, her daughter, the Princess Beatrice, does great honor to the purity of bleed that is au-pead to flow in royal veins, and the august mother may point to her with pride and say hat it was not necessary for her (the Queen) to have granddaughter, the Princess Beatrice possesses one of the princes of the leatures the soft expression of the eyes, and the tender smile combine to create an effect that can only be associated with women of que-nly character. She is high-bred to her flager tips, that is swiden; at his because of the leatures the soft expression of the eyes, and the tender smile combine to create an effect that can only be a

became acquainted with according to the service with Battenberg has not brought any prestice to ber. For some reason that young man is not regarded with much respect by the English people, and is generally reduced in all the nubilic prins whenever he performs an official countries of the time, and the nubilic prins whenever he performs an official countries of the time, and any according to the time, and Battenberg. The useen being appearable at the agreement of the time, and Battenberg, as husband, is permitted to linger near. This German prince who is in such public disavoris a slender young man, with a delicate, and not all the state of the second o

How He Came Out. From the Boston Courier. Buiffach—What's the matter. Wooden? Wooden—I've just been to ask old Cashber for his daughter. Wooden—Through the window.